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Abstract 
Using a panel of 4223 Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, and Romanian firms, over the period 
1998-2005, we show that financially constrained firms likely to face irreversibility 
constraints exhibit low and insignificant sensitivities of investment to cash flow. 
These firms typically use their cash flow to accumulate cash instead of investing. Our 
findings provide a new explanation for why some financially constrained firms may 
exhibit low investment-cash flow sensitivities. Specifically, controlling for investment 
irreversibility may matter for the interpretation of these sensitivities. 
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1.   Introduction 
A large body of empirical work has established the significance of financial variables 
in influencing firm level investment. In this work, measures of internal finance are 
found to be important determinants of investment even after controlling for 
investment opportunities (see Schiantarelli, 1995; Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007, for surveys). For example, within an augmented Q model, Fazzari et al. 
(1988) find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is much higher for firms 
which are a priori expected to be liquidity constrained. This finding has proven 
remarkably robust: it has been reported in a variety of datasets, different countries, 
and time periods. Accordingly, investment cash flows sensitivities have been 
interpreted as evidence of capital market imperfections that disturb firms’ investment 
from the frictionless neoclassical benchmark. An important challenge to this 
interpretation came from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who focused on the sub-sample 
of firms classified as liquidity constrained by Fazzari et al. (1988) and concluded that 
higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow cannot be interpreted as evidence that 
firms are more financially constrained. A heated debate followed the publication of 
Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) article (Fazzari et al., 2000; Kaplan and Zingales, 2000; 
Clearly, 1999; Guariglia, 2008 and so on)
 1.  
With very few exceptions, however, empirical studies on investment typically 
neglect the potential effects of investment irreversibility when testing for the capital 
market imperfections hypothesis. In this paper we argue that investment irreversibility 
may mute the response of investment to cash flow even for firms one would expect 
should exhibit a significant response, i.e. firms that face binding constraints on 
external finance. The failure to control for irreversibility may therefore adversely 
affect the inference based on investment cash flow sensitivities.   
Investment is irreversible when capital goods are firm or industry specific: in this 
case, expenditures on capital goods constitute unrecoverable sunk costs. However, 
even in the absence of capital specificity, investment may be at least partially 
irreversible if the purchase price of capital goods exceeds the resale price, or if 
                                                            
1 Other authors claim that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not good proxies for the presence of 
financing constraints, as cash flow typically picks up the effect of investment opportunities not 
properly accounted for by Tobin’s Q (Cummins et al, 2006; Bond et al, 2004). Yet, D’Espallier and 
Guariglia (2009) show that the investment opportunity bias is not a serious problem for unlisted firms. 3 
 
disinvesting entails significant fixed costs. Theoretical work on investment under 
uncertainty has analyzed the impact of irreversibility on firm investment (see Abel 
and Eberly, 1994; Bertola and Caballero, 1994; and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, among 
others). The key fundamental insight of this work is that irreversibility may generate a 
“reluctance to invest” or equivalently a “wait and see” approach: a forward looking 
firm may prefer to wait for the arrival of more information than to undertake a costly 
action with uncertain consequences. This “wait and see” approach in turn implies that 
some firms may choose to suspend profitable investment projects. It is therefore 
entirely possible that in the context of an augmented Q equation --the main empirical 
specification in the literature that aims to test for the importance of financing 
constraints-- cash flow may be found insignificant as a determinant of investment. In 
this case however, the unresponsiveness of investment cannot be interpreted as 
evidence against the importance of financing constraints; rather, it is a direct 
consequence of behavior induced by irreversibility.  
The purpose of our study is to provide, for the first time, a systematic empirical 
analysis of the effects of both irreversibility and financing constraints on firm level 
investment, focusing on the interactions between these constraints. To this end, we 
analyze the investment behavior of 4223 firms from four transition economies 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania). Our sample is an ideal setting 
to test for the importance of financial and irreversibility constraints because the 
economic environment in these countries is such that both constraints are likely to be 
relevant for a large fraction of firms
2. To the best of our knowledge, no paper in the 
literature has addressed the issue of irreversibility constraints in the context of 
transition economies.   
We estimate investment equations as a function of Tobin’s Q and cash flow, 
similar to those in Konings et al. (2003). Building on Konings et al. (2003) and 
Scaramozzino (1997), we then differentiate firms into more and less likely to face 
irreversibility constraints, with the aim of empirically assessing the extent to which 
firms with different degrees of investment irreversibility exhibit different investment-
cash flow sensitivities.  
                                                            
2 Budina et al. (2000), Konings et al. (2003), Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), Rizov (2004) and others 
document that financing constraints are prevalent in these economies. Moreover, second hand markets 
of capital goods are poorly developed in transition economies (Fox and Haller, 2006).  4 
 
We find that investment is sensitive to cash flow only for firms that are less likely 
to face irreversibility constraints. In contrast, despite significant financing constraints, 
investment is unresponsive to cash flow variations for those firms more likely to be 
characterized by investment irreversibility. Based on these findings we suggest that 
irreversibility may confound the effect of financing constraints, thus limiting the 
inference on the existence and importance of financing constraints that can be drawn 
from investment cash flow sensitivities.
3   
We also provide an answer to the following related question: how do firms, likely 
to face irreversibility constraints, respond to cash flow innovations? Based on a 
formal argument that we illustrate in section 3, we hypothesize that firms may 
accumulate cash instead of investing. This may happen because firms prefer to save 
the extra cash to protect against adverse future industry conditions or because this 
additional savings may help them to relax future financing constraints. To test this 
hypothesis, we formulate an equation a-la Almeida et al. (2004) and find that firms 
with irreversible capital display strong sensitivities of cash accumulation to cash flow.   
Our results suggest that irreversibility constraints can be seen as a new 
explanation for why, in some cases, firms facing financing constraints may exhibit 
low or insignificant sensitivities of investment to cash flow. They also carry 
significant policy implications. Considering that in the process of restructuring private 
sector enterprises in transition economies, firm investment is the main decision taken 
at the microeconomic level, policies that aim to stimulate investment through 
relaxation of financing constraints may not be successful in achieving the desired 
effect. In particular, tax incentives or other policies aiming to increase available 
internal resources for investment may have limited success for firms with irreversible 
capital. Our results indicate that firms may behave cautiously and respond to these 
incentives by saving the extra cash.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide an economic background 
for our analysis. Section 3 presents some theoretical considerations, aimed at 
motivating our empirical analysis. Section 4 illustrates our baseline specifications and 
estimation methodology. Section 5 describes our dataset and illustrates our sample 
separation criteria identifying firms more and less likely to face irreversible 
                                                            
3 Interestingly, and consistent with our findings, Caggese (2007a) shows that, in a simulated model,  
investment regressions based on variable (reversible) as opposed to fixed capital have more power in 
testing for financing constraints.  5 
 
constraints. Section 6 presents our main empirical results and some robustness tests, 
and section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Economic background 
Very little work in the literature combines both irreversibility and financing 
constraints. Most of this work is theoretical. For instance, Holt (2003) constructs a 
model in which he examines how firms’ investment and dividend policies interact 
under irreversibility and financial constraints. He notes that firms characterized by 
highly irreversible prospective investment find it more difficult to obtain external 
finance, as lenders would be more reluctant to lend to them.  
Bayer (2006) presents a model of investment that incorporates both constraints 
and finds a non-linear pattern of short term investment in the UK, consistent with the 
predictions of his model. Holt (2007) develops a model of investment under financial 
frictions and irreversibility, and finds that irreversibility exacerbates the effects of 
current financing constraints. Caggese (2007b) presents a model with fixed 
investment and inventories in which the irreversibility and financing constraints 
interact, and their effects amplify each other.  
To the best of our knowledge, Scaramozzino (1997) is the only paper which 
provides an empirical analysis of the interaction between the two constraints. Using 
data for UK listed firms, he estimates a simple Q-model of investment on various 
categories of firms, and finds that this model only performs well for firms that face 
neither financing, nor irreversibility constraints. Although Scaramozzino (1997) 
shows that cash flow attracts a positive and significant coefficient for all groups of 
firms except the fully unconstrained ones, he does not provide clear predictions on 
how this variable should affect the investment at firms facing different degrees of 
investment irreversibility. 
 
3.  Theoretical considerations 
In order to build some intuition on the role of non-convex adjustment costs, 
irreversibility, and financing constraints for the behavior of firms’ investment and 
cash accumulation, we add an irreversibility constraint to the simple (partial 
equilibrium) theoretical model developed by Whited (2006).  6 
 
Within this model, the firm uses capital to produce output. The period revenue 
function is given by  , where k denotes the capital stock and z represents a 
stochastic disturbance that combines productivity and demand shocks. This revenue 
function is continuous and concave, due to either decreasing returns to scale or market 
power. It can be thought of as a reduced form production function that has maximized 
out the variable factors of production.  
( , kz π )
I
It is assumed that the firm purchases and sells capital at a price of one and incurs a 
scale dependent fixed cost, ck whenever investment is not equal to zero. This type of 
adjustment cost is a parsimonious and simple way to capture the non-convexities that 
exist at the firm level. The evolution of the capital stock is given by  (1 ) kk δ ′=− + , 
where  denotes gross investment,  I δ is the depreciation rate, and a prime denotes next 
period values.   
The firm saves an amount m via a risk free one period bond that earns an 
interest rate r. As in Whited (2006), we assume that the firm cannot issue debt, i.e. 
m≥0. We then add a new further assumption to Whited’s (2006) model. Specifically, 
we assume that the firm faces significant costs when disinvesting. This can be 
captured parsimoniously with a strict irreversibility constraint,  .    0 I ≥
To model costly external finance, we follow Whited (2006) and use the approach 
developed by Gomes (2001). Specifically we assume that the firm incurs a premium 
for external finance whenever desired investment exceeds internal resources. We 
define the excess of desired investment over internal resources as,
() ( ) ( ) ,,,' 1 , ( 1 ) ' ekkmmz k k kz c k m r m δπ ′′ =−− − +− ++ . We  then specify a 
financing cost function,  ( ) e φ , where  ( ) 0 e φ =
 if   ( ) ,' 0 mmz ,, ekk ′ ≤  and  () 0 e φ >  if 
. We further assume () ,,,' 0 ekkmmz ′ > ( ) 0 e e φ > , where  ( ) e φ e  denotes the first order 
derivative of  ( ) e φ
.  
The firm chooses k’ and m’ each period to maximize the present discounted value 
of future cash flows. Let  ( ) ,, Vkm zdenote the value function of the firm. In the case 
in which the firm invests, this function satisfies the following equation:
() ()
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where   denotes the market interest rate, used for discounting future cash flows,  r λ  is 
the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the irreversibility constraint on 
investment, and θ is the Langrage multiplier associated with the constraint on 
savings. The expectations operator is taken with respect to the information set at time 
, which includes the shock .   t z
The first order necessary condition for optimal investment is given by: 
'
1
1 { ( 1 ( ) ) ( ( , ) ( 1)) ( 1)
(1 )(1 ( ) )
tk e
e
Ee k z c
re
} φ πδ λ
φλ
′ ′′ ′ ′ =+ + − −
++ −
δ − −            (2) 
where πk’ denotes the derivative of π with respect to k’. The left hand side of this 
optimality condition represents the cost (in terms of reduction in dividends) of 
investing an additional unit of capital, while the right hand side represents the benefit 
(in terms of increase in the expected future discounted firm value) of this additional 
investment. The optimality condition can be used to illustrate several important 
points. First, when the firm is using external finance, the effective discount rate for 
future cash flows rises (( )0 ) e e φ > , effectively pushing the profitability threshold for 
investment projects higher. As Whited (2006) demonstrates in simulation results, this 
in effect imposes an additional adjustment cost on capital and may therefore adversely 
affect the timing of investment, i.e. firms may suspend investment.  
Second, the presence of fixed capital adjustment costs, reduces future cash flows 
by the constant c, and hence also reduces the attractiveness of investment. In this 
case, we should expect the firm to only undertake investment projects that are 
expected to yield high revenue (e.g. those projects with higher z′), so that the firm 
can expect to recover the fixed cost.  
The irreversibility constraint generates a similar retarding effect on investment. 
Let us assume for simplicity that this constraint does not bind in the current period, 
but is expected to bind in the future (i.e. let 0, 0 λ λ′ = > ). In this case, a very low 
value of future marginal profitability (which may result from a low  value) implies 
that the firm may want to get rid of capital in the future, a very costly action. The firm 
takes into account this possibility and thus optimally chooses a level of investment 
lower than it would have been without this constraint in effect (in an extreme case, the 
firm would not invest at all). This illustrates the well known “reluctance to invest” 
effect of irreversibility.  
z′8 
 
Both fixed capital adjustment costs and irreversibility can therefore adversely 
affect the inter-temporal allocation of investment either by raising the threshold levels 
of profitability or by inducing a cautious approach when investing. As shown by 
Whited (2006), optimal capital accumulation follows in this case an intermittent 
pattern with infrequent adjustment (i.e. a two sided (S,s) rule), where there is a large 
range of inactivity. This discussion has an obvious implication: for some firms, 
investment may be unresponsive to a rise in internal funds because they operate in the 
range of inactivity of the capital accumulation rule.
4  
The insights offered by our model lead to a natural question: if investment is 
delayed or suspended as a result of the considerations above, how do firms respond to 
innovations in cash flow? In the simple framework presented above there are two 
options: either distribute the extra cash to owners (for instance in the form of 
dividends) or save it as cash. Whited (2006) shows that firms follow a bang-bang 
policy with respect to savings: they save as much as possible in periods in which there 
is no investment. Thus cash flow innovations are hoarded as savings. Firms then use 
these savings for investment in periods in which they choose to invest. We should 
therefore expect firms with no investment activity to rapidly accumulate cash and use 
it in the periods they invest. The intuition follows from the costly external finance 
assumption: because raising external finance is costly, firms that do not invest, 
accumulate as much cash as possible in order to reduce future reliance on external 
finance. Thus optimal investment activity is directly linked (via the budget constraint) 
with the accumulation of financial resources by firms. This is a useful insight we 
exploit in the empirical tests we design below.  
The implications of our model can thus be summarized as follows. First, 
investment may be unresponsive to cash flow innovations, due to non-convex capital 
adjustment costs and irreversibility. Second, cash accumulation may be prevalent in 
periods in which firms do not invest.
5 In the sections that follow, we undertake an 
empirical analysis of firm level investment using the implications of this model as a 
guide for choosing our empirical specifications. 
 
                                                            
4 Pratap (2003) uses a similar reasoning-based on non-convex adjustment costs-to explain why firms 
facing significant liquidity constraints may exhibit very little sensitivity of investment to cash flow. 
5 This prediction is also consistent with Riddick and Whited (2009) who show that there should be a 
positive sensitivity of savings to cash flow for firms with intermittent investment due to fixed capital 
adjustment costs. 9 
 
 
4.  Baseline specifications and estimation methodology 
 
4.1  Baseline specifications: As in Konings et al. (2003), we initially estimate an 
















where Iit denotes firm i’s investment at time t and CFit , its cash flow. Qit represents 
Tobin’s  Q, which is included in our specification to control for investment 
opportunities
6. Tobin’s Q is typically defined as the market value of the firm over the 
replacement value of its capital stock. As most of the firms in our sample are not 
listed on the stock market, we are unable to assess their market value. Hence, we 
control for investment opportunities in two different ways. First, following Konings et 
al. (2003) and Bakucks et al. (2009), we use the firm’s sales growth, instead of Q,  as 
a proxy for the firm’s future profitability. Second, we include time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies in all our specification. As discussed in Brown et al. 
(2009), Brown and Petersen (2009), and Duchin et al. (2010), since these dummies 
account for all time-varying demand shocks at the industry level, their inclusion 
represents an indirect way to control for investment opportunities or more general 
demand factors. 
The error term in Equation (3), εit, comprises a firm-specific time-invariant 
component, encompassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence 
investment, as well as the time-invariant component of the measurement error 
affecting any of the regression variables; a time-specific component accounting for 
possible business cycle effects; and an idiosyncratic component. We control for the 
firm-specific time-invariant component of the error term by estimating our equation in 
first-differences, and for the time-specific component by including time dummies (in 
 
6 See the Appendix for precise definitions of all our variables. 10 
 
addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all our 
specifications. 
When constraints on the availability of external finance bind -- a very likely 
situation in transition economies (de Haas, 2001)
7 -- firms can only pursue profitable 
investment projects using internal funds. Costly external finance may thus retard 
investment spending if firms do not have adequate internal funds to undertake this 
spending. We therefore expect a positive and significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivity (i.e. a positive and significant α2 coefficient in Equation 3).  
However, as we have explained in section 3, this may no longer be the case 
when we explicitly consider irreversibility. In fact, in the presence of innovations to 
cash flow, firms facing irreversibility constraints may act cautiously and put aside the 
extra cash as a future buffer, instead of investing. This cautious behavior will be more 
likely to obtain in environments characterized by high levels of uncertainty, such as 
the transition economies that we focus on (Susjan and Redek, 2008)
8. In order to 
verify whether this is the case, we undertake two additional tests. The first consists in 
estimating the following specification, where IRRi is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i 
faces irreversible investment over the sample period, and 0 otherwise
9. 
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     (4) 
If our hypothesis were true, we would expect cash flow not to significantly 
affect investment at firms characterized by relatively high levels of capital 
irreversibility, while it would still affect the investment of firms with low levels of 
capital irreversibility. Hence, we would expect α21 to be poorly determined, and only 
α22 to be statistically significant.  
Our second test of the hypothesis according to which, in the presence of 
innovations to cash flow, firms facing irreversibility constraints act cautiously and put 
 
7 Also see Arellano et al. (2009) who provide compelling evidence that financial markets are poorly 
developed in transition economies: they document that over the period 2000-2004, the ratio of private 
credit to GDP was equal to 37%, 22%, and 11%, respectively in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and 
Romania; while it was equal to 143% in the UK, 143% in the Netherlands, and 87% in France.   
8 This is because the level of cautiousness in investment typically rises with uncertainty. See Bloom et 
al. (2007) for an illustration of this argument and an application using firm level UK data. 
9 Details on how this dummy is constructed are provided in the next section. 11 
 
aside extra cash as a buffer instead of investing is focused  on the estimation of the  
following model, similar to Almeida et al.’s (2004), which relates the firm’s 
accumulation of cash to total assets ratio (ΔCashit/Total Assetsi(t-1)) to its cash flow to 
assets ratio, Tobin’s Q (proxied by sales growth), and size (measured by the logarithm 
of its total assets)
10: 
 








ββ β β η −
−− −
Δ
=+ + + +      (5)
 
            
Size is included in this model to capture potential economies of scale in cash 
management. As suggested by Almeida et al. (2004) and Khurana (2006), a positive 
and precisely determined propensity to save cash out of cash flow can be interpreted 
as an indication of the presence of financing constraints in our sample. Specifically, 
forward looking firms may accumulate cash in order to relax future financing 
constraints. Thus cash accumulation may be an indicator of the presence of financing 
constraints, as constrained firms save cash to hedge the fluctuations in their cash flow. 
In addition to the above, firms may engage in cash hoarding due to precautionary 
motives
11. This may arise, for example, when there are concerns about future survival 
prospects, and may be a relevant motive when market conditions change swiftly as in 
the economies we focus on, where a host of structural and market reforms were (and 
still are) under way during the sample period
12. 
With reference to the formalization we provided in section 3, we next test 
whether, as predicted by the model, firms with irreversible capital tend to accumulate 
cash at a relatively faster pace compared to firms with reversible capital, in response 
                                                            
10Pal and Ferrando (2006), Khurana (2006), and Riddick and Whited (2009) estimate similar equations, 
which include a variety of additional regressors. 
11 See Han and Qiu (2007) for a careful analysis of the precautionary motive for a firm’s cash holdings. 
12 An imperfect indicator for the relevance of the precautionary motive is the high risk of bankruptcy 
characterizing transition economies compared to Western economies. Transition economies are 
characterized by significantly higher corporate failure rates: according to our dataset, failure rates in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria are respectively 5.5%, 2.3%, and 2.6%, compared to only 
1.5% in the UK (Bridges and Guariglia, 2008). 12 
 
to innovations to cash flow. To this end, we interact our cash flow variable in 
Equation (5) with the IRRit dummy, which leads to the following equation: 
 
01 2 1 2 2 3 1
11 1 1
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We expect firms characterized by high degrees of irreversibility to display higher 
sensitivities of cash accumulation to cash flow, compared to firms with low degrees of 
irreversibility. The coefficient β21 should therefore be larger than β22.  
 
4.2 Estimation  methodology:  All equations are estimated in first-differences, to 
control for firm-specific, time-invariant effects. Given the possible endogeneity of our 
regressors, we use a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator combines in a 
system the relevant equation in first differences and in levels. It makes use of values 
of the regressors lagged twice or more as instruments in the differenced equation, and 
of differences of the regressors lagged once in the levels equation.  The system GMM 
estimator is preferred to the simple first-difference GMM estimator when instruments 
are likely to be weak (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
To evaluate whether our instruments are legitimate and our model is correctly 
specified, we use the Sargan test (also known as J test), which is a test for 
overidentifying restrictions, and the test for second-order serial correlation of the 
residuals in the differenced equation (m2). Under the null of instrument validity, the 
former test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. The m2 test is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no second-order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a check on the 






13 If the un-differenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, 
but not second-order serial correlation. Note that neither the Sargan nor the m2 tests allow to 
discriminate between bad instruments and model specification.  13 
 
5.  Data and summary statistics 
 
5.1  Data: Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the 
AMADEUS database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). 
The database includes balance sheet and profit and loss information for over 11 
million public and private companies in 41 European countries over the period 1998-
2005. Our focus is on the four transition economies also studied by Konings et al. 
(2003): Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania
14. 
The sample we choose to work with is particularly well suited for assessing the 
interaction between irreversibility and financing constraints. As we document below 
the economies we focus on, are characterized by high levels of uncertainty compared 
to developed economies and have poorly developed credit markets and limited resale 
markets for used capital (Fox and Haller, 2006). These considerations serve to 
illustrate that financial and irreversibility constraints are expected to be particularly 
severe in these economies.   
De Haas (2001) and Arellano et al. (2009) document that capital markets are 
poorly developed in transition economies. Specifically, Arellano et al. (2009) measure 
financial development with the level of private credit to GDP and order the 22 
countries in their sample according to this measure. They find that Romania (whose 
level of private credit to GDP is 11%) ranks last, while Bulgaria (with 22%) ranks 
nineteenth, and the Czech Republic (with 37%) ranks sixteenth
15. For comparison, 
Denmark, which ranks first, has a percentage of private credit to GDP of 147%. 
The level of firm specific and aggregate uncertainty is also considerably higher in 
these economies compared with a developed economy like the US. We document this 
in two ways. First, following Bloom (2009), we compute the inter-quartile range of 
the cross sectional spread of firm level sales in our sample as a measure of firm level 
uncertainty. We obtain a value equal to 0.37 for Bulgaria, 0.25 for Czech Republic, 
0.31 for Poland, and 0.40 for Romania. In contrast, the corresponding measure for the 
US is only 0.15. Second, we compute the standard deviation of GDP growth as a 
                                                            
14 We have only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the 
firms in our dataset are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of firms belonging to 
groups, which would be included in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts were also part of it. 
15 Note that Poland is not included in the set of countries analyzed by Arellano et al. (2009) but has a 
similar low domestic bank credit to GDP ratio (Mueller and Peev, 2007). All statistics reported by 
Arellano et al. (2009) refer to the year 2005. De Haas (2001) reports similar statistics for an earlier 
period. 14 
 
measure of macroeconomic volatility or more loosely of aggregate uncertainty. The 
values we obtain are also considerably higher in transition economies compared to the 
US: they are equal to 1.53 for Bulgaria, 1.62 for the Czech Republic, 1.41 for Poland, 
2.75 for Romania, but only to 1.3 for the US. This high level of uncertainty combined 
with the fact that transition economies are characterized by very thin secondary 
markets for capital equipment (Fox and Heller, 2006) suggests that irreversibility is 
likely to be a very important factor in these countries, and thus expected to 
significantly affect firms’ investment behavior. 
We drop observations with negative sales, as well as observations with 
negative total assets. Firms that do not have complete records on our main regression 
variables are also dropped. To control for the potential influence of outliers, we 
exclude observations in the one percent tails for each of our regression variables. 
Finally, we drop all firms with less than 5 years of consecutive observations. Our final 
panel, which is unbalanced, covers 462 firms for Bulgaria (corresponding to 2314 
observations), 1539 firms for the Czech Republic (corresponding to 7757 
observations), 1208 firms for Poland (corresponding to 5629 observations), and 1014 
firms for Romania (corresponding to 4656 observations)
16. The majority of these 
firms are unlisted, and hence particularly likely to face financing constraints 
(Guariglia, 2008). 
 
5.2  Sample separation criteria: Following Leahy and Whited (1996) and Drakos 
and Goulas (2006), we initially partition our firms into more and less likely to face 
irreversibility constraints based on the time-series variance of their labor to capital 
ratio. Specifically, we classify a firm i as facing a relatively high (low) degree of 
irreversibility if the variance of its labor to capital ratio over the period considered 
falls in the bottom (top) half of the distribution of the ratios of all firms belonging to 
the same industry as firm i. The rationale for this classification is that a greater 
variability in a firm’s labor to capital ratio highlights greater ability to substitute labor 
for capital, and suggests a lower degree of irreversibility of the firm’s capital stock.  
As a robustness test, we use two additional sample separation criteria. First, 
following Chirinko and Schaller (2009), we classify firms on the basis of the average 
depreciation to capital ratios of the industry in which they operate. In particular, we 
                                                            
16 See the Appendix for information about the structure of our panels. 15 
 
classify a firm as being more (less) likely to face a high degree of irreversibility if this 
ratio is below (above) the median depreciation rate over all industries. This 
classification is motivated by the fact that, in addition to selling capital, firms can 
reduce their capital stock through depreciation. As noted by Chirinko and Schaller 
(2009), in industries with low depreciation rates, this recourse is sharply limited, 
which can be seen as further evidence of the importance of irreversibility.   
Second, we follow the criterion proposed by Scaramozzino (1997), which consists 
in classifying firm i as facing a higher degree of irreversibility in year t if its 
investment to capital ratio falls below the median ratio of all firms operating in the 
same industry a firm i  in year t. The rationale behind this classification is that 
irreversibility constraints may reduce the attractiveness of investing in capital 
equipment. In all cases, we construct a dummy variable, IRRi(t), which is equal to 1 if 
firm i faces irreversible investment (at time t), and 0 otherwise
17. 
 
5.3 Summary  statistics:  Table 1A presents descriptive statistics of all variables 
used in our investment models for the entire sample. Table 1B provides similar 
statistics for the variables used in our cash models. The investment to capital ratio 
ranges from a minimum of 17.2% in Romania, to a maximum of 31.9% in Bulgaria. 
These rates are much higher than those characterizing Western European countries. 
For instance, focusing on the period 1978-89, Bond et al. (2003) report investment to 
capital rates of 12.5% in Belgium, 11.1% in France, 12.2% in Germany, and 11.7% in 
the UK. The high investment rates in transition economies can be justified in the light 
of the fact that firms operating in these countries need to invest heavily in order to 
modernize their obsolete capital stock and acquire competitiveness in the global 
economy (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002). 
The cash flow to capital ratios range from 24.3% in Bulgaria to 35.2% in Poland, 
and are in line with those reported by Bayraktar et al. (2005) for Germany
18. The cash 
to assets ratio ranges from 5.9% in Romania to 7.2% in the Czech Republic. These 
numbers are lower than those reported by Almeida et al. (2004) for US firms, which 
range from 8-9% for unconstrained firms to 15% for their constrained counterparts, 
                                                            
17 Note that only our last measure of irreversibility is time-varying. All our results were robust to 
constructing a time-invariant measure of irreversibility based on firms’ average investment to capital 
ratios. 
18 Our figures are not directly comparable with those reported in Bond et al. (2003), due to slight 
differences in cash flow definitions. 16 
 
but are in line with those reported by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) for countries such as 
Spain and Portugal
19. Finally, the cash accumulation to assets ratios range from 0.1% 
for Romania to 1.0% for Bulgaria.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in our investment 
models, respectively for firms assumed to face higher and lower degrees of 
irreversibility on the basis of the variance of their labor to capital ratios. It is 
interesting to note that the real capital stock is always significantly higher for firms 
with irreversible investment, compared to those with reversible investment. For the 
former, the values range from 33.5 (thousands of Euros) for Romania to 113.8 for the 
Czech Republic, whereas for the latter, they range from 7.6 for Romania to 28.2 for 
the Czech Republic, with all differences being statistically significant. This can be 
explained considering that irreversible capital consists mainly of land and buildings, 
while reversible capital consists of computers, telecom equipment and so on.  
With the exception of Romania, the investment to capital ratio is always lower for 
those firms more likely to face a higher degree of irreversibility. For instance, for 
Bulgaria, the investment to capital ratio of firms with reversible investment is 41.0%, 
while the corresponding figure for firms with irreversible investment is 25.6%. The 
difference between these two figures is statistically significant, as is the corresponding 
difference for Poland and the Czech Republic. This may be a consequence of the 
higher capital stock characterizing firms with irreversible investment. Alternatively, it 
may suggest that firms more likely to face irreversibility constraints may be more 
reluctant to invest.  
Firms more likely to face a higher degree of investment irreversibility display 
lower cash flow to capital ratios. Specifically the average cash flow to capital ratio of 
firms with irreversible capital in Bulgaria is 21.3% compared to 27.9% for firms with 
reversible capital. The corresponding figures for the Czech Republic are 22.0% versus 
32.9%; for Poland, 29.1% versus 41.6%; and for Romania, 29.6% versus 39.3%. All 
these differences are statistically significant.  
Finally, firms more likely to face irreversibility constraints also exhibit low sales 
growth to capital ratios: these range from 23.5% for the Czech Republic to 33.7% in 
the case of Poland. The corresponding figures for firms with reversible investment 
range from 49.5% for the Czech Republic to 68.1% for Bulgaria.  
                                                            
19 Note that our ratios are not perfectly comparable to theirs as we divide cash holdings by total assets, 
while they divide them by net assets (i.e. total assets net of cash). 17 
 
In summary, irreversibility seems to be associated not only with lower investment 
rates, but also with lower cash flow rates and lower sales growth.   
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our cash models, for 
firms facing higher and lower degrees of irreversibility. In line with the statistics 
reported in Table 2, we can see that firms with a higher degree of irreversibility are 
typically larger than their counterparts with reversible capital, in terms of real assets. 
Specifically, for firms with irreversible investment, real assets range from 71.0 
(thousands of Euros) for Romania to 211.7 for the Czech Republic, while the 
corresponding figures for firms with reversible capital range from 17.8 for Romania to 
72.2 for Poland. Furthermore, firms more likely to face irreversibility constraints have 
lower cash to assets ratios. Specifically, Bulgarian firms with irreversible capital hold 
on average 4.6% of their total assets in the form of cash and marketable securities, 
while their counterparts with reversible capital hold 8.8%. Corresponding figures for 
the Czech Republic are 6.2% versus 8.2%; for Poland, 5.1% versus 6.0%, and for 
Romania 4.3% versus 6.0%. All these differences are statistically significant. These 
findings are probably due to the fact that, as discussed above, firms characterized by 
irreversible investment have significantly higher total assets than their counterparts 
with reversible investment. Figures for real cash holdings for firms with irreversible 
capital are in fact higher than those for firms with reversible capital: in the case of the 
former, they range from 3.0 for Romania to 10.3 for the Czech Republic, while in the 
case of the latter, they are considerably lower and range from 1.17 for Romania to 5.0 
for the Czech Republic.  
Finally, the figures for the cash accumulation to assets ratios of irreversible capital 
firms are 0.5%, 0.6%, 0.8%, and 0.1%, respectively for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Romania. The corresponding figures for firms with reversible investment 
in the four countries are 1.5%, 0.6%, 0.9%, and 0%. No clear pattern emerges 
regarding the magnitudes of these ratios across firms with reversible and irreversible 
capital. 
In the sections that follow, we analyze the links between investment and cash 
flow, on the one hand; and cash accumulation and cash flow, on the other, within a 





6.  Empirical results 
 
6.1 Baseline  models: Table 4A presents estimates of Equation (3) for our four 
countries. The cash flow coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all 
countries. In terms of magnitudes, these coefficients range from 0.36 for Romania to 
0.96 for Bulgaria. These coefficients suggest that the elasticity of investment to cash 
flow, evaluated at sample means, is 0.73 for Bulgaria and 0.71 for Romania. In other 
words, a 10% increase in cash flow implies a 7.3% and 7.1% increase in investment 
for Bulgarian and Romanian firms respectively. The elasticities for the Czech 
Republic and Poland are 0.47 and 0.53, respectively.  These results suggest that firms 
in all four transition countries suffer from significant financing constraints. Konings et 
al. (2003) reached a similar conclusion for Poland and the Czech Republic, but did not 
find evidence of financing constraints for Bulgaria and Romania. The difference 
between our results and theirs may be due to the fact that their sample covers a much 
earlier time period (1994-1999). It is therefore possible that Bulgaria and Romania 
still faced soft budget constraints at the start of their transition process, while in most 
recent years, they have been converging towards the markets economy model. This 
interpretation is in line with Mueller and Peev (2007) who document that soft budget 
constraints in Central and Eastern Europe have been hardened over the 1999-2003 
period.  
Table 4B presents the estimates of our baseline cash accumulation model. In line 
with Almeida et al. (2004) and Pal and Ferrando (2006), all four countries exhibit 
positive sensitivities of cash accumulation to cash flow, which confirms that they all 
suffer from liquidity constraints. The coefficients on cash flow range from 0.096 for 
Bulgaria to 0.118 for the Czech Republic. These findings are economically important: 
the elasticities of cash with respect to cash flow, evaluated at sample means, are 1.07 
and 1.99 for Bulgaria and the Czech Republic respectively. Thus a 10% increase in 
firms’ cash flow is associated with a 10.7% and 19.9% increase in cash accumulation 
for Bulgarian and Czech firms. The elasticities for Poland and Romania are 1.25 and 
1.49, respectively. The cash flow sensitivities of cash for our four transition 
economies are higher in magnitude compared to the sensitivities obtained by Almeida 
et al. (2004) for the US. Considering the relatively low level of financial development 
characterizing transition economies in comparison with the US (de Haas, 2001; 
Arellano et al., 2009), and considering that financial development reduces the costs of 19 
 
external funds and eases firms’ financing constraints, this result is consistent with 
Khurana et al.’s (2006) finding that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is higher for 
countries characterized by lower financial development. In both Tables 4A and 4B, 
the Sargan test statistics are insignificant at the conventional 5% level, and in most 
cases the m2 test does not highlight problems with our instruments.  
 
6.2  Differentiating firms according to the degree of investment irreversibility: 
One issue with the estimates reported in Tables 4A and 4B, is that they do not 
differentiate the effects of cash flow on investment and cash accumulation of firms 
facing different degrees of investment irreversibility. Yet, as discussed in section 3, it 
is possible that firms with irreversible investment are less likely to invest and more 
likely to accumulate cash as a consequence of innovations in cash flow, than their 
counterparts with reversible investment. 
To further investigate this issue, estimates of Equation (4) are presented in Table 
5A. In both tables, we control for irreversibility using the variance of each firm’s 
labor to capital ratios over the period considered. We can see that it is only those firms 
characterized by relatively low degrees of irreversibility, which exhibit positive and 
significant sensitivities of investment to cash flow. Investment at firms with relatively 
high degrees of irreversibility is always unresponsive to cash flow. The largest 
coefficient for firms with reversible capital is observed for Bulgaria (1.13), which 
indicates that the elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow, evaluated at 
sample means, is 0.45. The cash flow coefficients for firms with reversible capital in 
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania are respectively 0.39, 0.38, and 0.33. The 
corresponding elasticities are 0.19, 0.29 and 0.39.  
For comparison, in the last column of Table 5A, we report the estimates of 
Equation (4) based on 8,852 UK firms
20. Considering that the UK is characterized by 
a much lower degree of financing constraints and a much lower degree of uncertainty 
compared to transition economies, we do not expect the same results to hold. We can 
in fact see that it is those firms with irreversibile capital, which display the highest 
investment-cash flow sensitivities (0.50 compared to 0.11 for firms with reversible 
                                                            
20 Data for UK firms are also drawn from the AMADEUS database. 20 
 
capital). Yet, the difference between these two coefficients is not statistically 
significant
21. 
These findings are in line with our prediction according to which, in economies 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty and a high degree of financing constraints 
such as transition economies, firms characterized by a high degree of irreversibility 
may be reluctant to further increase their investment spending following increases in 
cash flow
22. Irreversibility constraints may therefore contribute to reducing the 
investment cash flow sensitivities even for firms that are likely to face binding 
liquidity constraints. Consequently, they limit the usefulness of such regressions as 
tests for the financing constraints hypothesis. This result highlights that researchers 
should properly control for the presence of irreversible capital when attempting to 
interpret investment-cash flow sensitivities. Importantly, it also suggests that policies 
aimed at promoting investment (e.g. tax incentives) may be inadequate to achieve the 
desired outcome if a significant fraction of firms is likely to face irreversibility 
constraints.  
Table 5B reports estimates of our cash accumulation equation (Equation 6). Here, 
in accordance with the prediction of section 3, cash flow coefficients are only 
significant for those firms with irreversible capital. They range from values of 0.10 for 
Poland to 0.38 for the Czech Republic. The elasticities evaluated at sample means 
suggest that increasing cash flow by 10% leads to a 7.75% and 33.8% rise in cash 
accumulation for Poland and the Czech Republic respectively. In line with the 
model’s intuition, these estimates suggest firms with irreversible capital prefer to 
accumulate cash, rather than to accumulate more fixed productive assets. In contrast, 
the last column of Table 5B shows that there is no statistically significant difference 
in the cash-cash flow sensitivities reported for UK firms
23. The comparison of our 
transition economies with the UK highlights the relevance of irreversibility 
constraints in the former, but not the latter. In both Tables 5A and 5B, the Sargan and 
m2 tests do not highlight significant problems with the choice of our instruments and 
the specification of our model.   
                                                            
21 An F-test for the equality of the cash flow coefficients for firms characterized by more and less 
reversible investment delivers in fact a p-value of 0.12. 
22 As firms characterized by irreversible investment are typically larger than those with reversible 
investment (Table 3), one could argue that the irreversibility dummy simply captures a size effect. Yet, 
all our results were robust to controlling for size in the regressions. 
23 An F-test for the equality of the cash flow coefficients for firms characterized by more and less 
reversible investment delivers in fact a p-value of 0.81 21 
 
Tables 6A and 6B report the investment and cash regressions, when firms are 
divided into more and less likely to face irreversibility, based on their industries’ 
depreciation rates. Once again, the regressions of the former group indicate that for 
Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, investment is sensitive to cash flow only for those 
firms with reversible capital (Table 6A). For the Czech Republic, the cash flow 
coefficient is significant for both firms with reversible and irreversible capital, but 
considerably larger for the former. Focusing on the cash regressions (Table 6B), we 
can see that it is those firms with irreversible capital that display the highest 
sensitivities of cash to cash flow. Yet, the relevant coefficient is only statistically 
significant for the Czech Republic and Romania. 
Finally, Tables 7A and 7B present estimates of Equations (4) and (6) respectively, 
when the irreversibility dummy is constructed based on the firms’ investment to 
capital ratios. Once again, only firms with reversible capital exhibit positive and 
significant sensitivities of investment to cash flow. Furthermore, firms with 
irreversible capital in Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic, all display positive 
and precisely determined sensitivities of cash to cash flow. In the case of the Czech 
Republic, also firms with reversible capital exhibit a positive sensitivity. Yet, this 
sensitivity is lower in magnitude compared to that of firms with irreversible capital. In 
the case of Poland, both types of firms have insignificant cash to cash flow 
sensitivities.   
In summary, regardless of the way in which we partition firms into more and less 
likely to face irreversibility constraints, our results suggest that in transition 
economies, firms likely to face irreversibility of capital will be reluctant to invest, but 
will prefer to channel additional internal funds to accumulate cash instead. On the 
other hand, firms characterized by reversible capital will typically invest out of extra 
cash flow, as predicted by the financing constraints literature. It is therefore possible 
that the insignificant or low investment-cash flow sensitivities reported in previous 
work (such as Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; and Cummins et al., 2006) 
may be due to irreversibility constraints faced by these firms, and not accounted for in 
their models. 
  
7.  Conclusions 
We have used a panel of 4223 mainly unlisted firms from four transition economies 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania) to study the interactions 22 
 
between financing and irreversibility constraints. When estimating an investment 
equation for the whole sample neglecting irreversibility, we found evidence of high 
investment-cash flow sensitivities, suggesting that financing constraints are binding in 
transition economies. Yet, when we controlled for irreversibility we found that, even 
though both are expected to face the same degree of financing constraints, firms with 
reversible capital exhibit a significant response of investment to cash flow, while 
firms with irreversible capital exhibit a non significant response. Furthermore, firms 
with irreversible capital exhibit high sensitivities of cash accumulation to cash flow. 
These results, which are robust to measuring irreversibility in different ways, suggest 
that irreversibility confounds the effects of financing constraints in empirical 
investment equations, adversely affecting the inference based on investment cash flow 
sensitivities. Hence, irreversibility constraints can be seen as a new explanation for 
why in some cases, firms facing financing constraints may exhibit low and 
insignificant sensitivities of investment to cash flow. 
  Our findings have two implications. First, researchers who aim at testing the 
presence of capital markets imperfections should carefully try to assess the likely 
impact of irreversibility before making any inferences based on investment-cash flow 
sensitivities.  Second, policies that aim to stimulate investment through the relaxation 
of financing constraints may not be successful in achieving the desired effect. 
Specifically, tax incentives or other policies aimed at increasing available internal 




Definitions of the variables used 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current assets 
include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
Cash: cash and equivalents. 
Fixed investment: difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets (which 
include land and buildings; fixtures and fittings; and plant and vehicles) of end of year 
t and end of year t-1, plus depreciation of year t. 23 
 
Capital stock: tangible fixed assets. 
 Q: Tobin’s Q proxied by the firm’s sales growth. 
Sales: firm’s total sales (including domestic and overseas sales). 
Deflators: all variables are deflated using the GDP deflator for the relevant country. 
 
 
Structure of the unbalanced panel  
 
I.  Bulgaria 





5 238  10.29  10.29 
6 353  15.25  25.54 
7 444  19.19  44.73 
8 1,279  55.27  100.00 
Total  2,314 100.00   
 
II.  Czech Republic 





5 956  12.37  12.37 
6 1380  17.78  30.15 
7 1591  20.50  50.65 
8 3830  49.35  100.00 
Total  7,757 100.00   
 
III.  Poland 





5 788  14.00  14.00 
6 883  15.69  29.69 
7 1,035  18.39  48.07 
8 2,923  51.93  100.00 
Total  5,629 100.00   
 
IV.  Romania 





5 311  6.68  6.68 
6 422  9.06  15.74 
7 656  14.09  29.83 
8 3,267  70.17  100.00 
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TABLE 1A: Summary statistics: baseline investment model 













  (.540) (.278) (.346) (0.648) 
Q/K  0.446 0.357 0.467 0.033       
  (1.391) (1.039) (1.501) (1.385) 
Cash Flow/K  0.243 0.271 0.352 0.346   
  (0.290) (0.321) (0.441) (0.571) 
 K  34.801 73.565 60.825 19.917 
  (64.075) 
 
(127.977) (98.248)  (41.448) 
Observations  2314 7757 5629 4656 
 
Note: I represents the firm’s real investment; K, its real capital stock (expressed in thousands of euros); 
and Q, Tobin’s Q, proxied by the firm’s sales growth. The numbers in this Table are means, with 
standard deviations in parentheses. See the Appendix for precise definitions of all variables. 
 
 
TABLE 1B: Summary statistics: baseline cash model 













  (0.098) (0.087) (0.087) (0.085) 
∆Cash/A  0.009 0.006 0.008 0.0008 
  (0.068) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) 
Q/A  0.181 0.130 0.163 0.019 
  (0.533) (0.328) (0.482) (0.491) 
Cash Flow/A  0.107 0.105 0.129 0.132 
  (0.107) (0.090) (0.122) (0.174) 
Cash  2.855 8.124 7.177 1.936 
  (8.188) (23.241)  (19.855)  (5.938) 
A  69.664 145.795  130.862  43.107 
  (114.922) 
 
(222.750) (192.222) (82.657) 
Observations  2310 7747 5600 4651 
 
Note: A represents the firm’s real total real assets (expressed in thousands of euros); and Q, Tobin’s Q, 
proxied by the firm’s sales growth. Cash represents real cash holdings, expressed in thousands of euros. 
The numbers in this Table are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. See the Appendix for 









IRR=1        IRR=0 
Diff.  Czech 
Republic 
 




































  (0.458) (0.642)   (0.217) (0.330)   (0.306) (0.377)   (0.688) (0.675)  
Q/K  0.252     0.681     0.00  0.235       0.494     0.00  0.337     0.605     0.00  0.257    0.677     0.00 
  (0.982)    (1.737)      (0.707)    (1.304)      (1.081)    (1.830)      (1.055)    (1.818)     
Cash Flow/K  0.213      0.279      0.00  0.220     0.3294     0.00  0.2914      0.416    0.00  0.295      0.393      0.00 
  (0.266)    (0.313)      (0.209)    (0.405)      (0.336)    (0.524)      (0.525)    (0.607)     
K  53.175 12.721 0.00  113.835  28.170 0.00  91.920 27.742 0.00  33.467 7.612  0.09 





















Note : IRR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm faces irreversible investment, and 0 otherwise.  More specifically, it takes the value 1 for firm i if the variance of firm i’s  
labor to capital ratio over the period considered falls in the bottom  half of the distribution of the ratios  of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i, and 0 otherwise. I 
represents the firm’s real investment; K, its real capital stock (expressed in thousands of euros); and Q, Tobin’s Q, proxied by the firm’s sales growth. The numbers in this 






TABLE 3: Summary statistics for the cash model: controlling for irreversibility with the variance of the labor to capital ratio 
 
 
Note: IRR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm faces irreversible investment, and 0 otherwise.  More specifically, it takes the value 1 for firm i if the variance of firm i’s  
labor to capital ratio over the period considered falls in the bottom  half of the distribution of the ratios  of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i, and 0 otherwise. 
A represents the firm’s real total real assets (expressed in thousands of euros); and Q, Tobin’s Q, proxied by the firm’s sales growth. Cash represents real cash holdings, 
expressed in thousands of euros. The numbers in this Table are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. See the Appendix for precise definitions of all variables. Diff. 





IRR=1        IRR=0 
Diff.  Czech 
Republic 
 




































  (0.071) (0.120)   (0.078) (0.094)   (0.080) (0.089)   (0.064) (0.095)  
∆ Cash/A  0.005 0.0149  0.00  0.006 0.006 0.72  0.008 0.009 0.87  0.001 -0.001  0.14 
  (0.053) (0.082)   (0.047) (0.057)   (0.051) (0.053)   (0.054) (0.067)  
Q/A  0.111     0.262      0.00  0.110    0.152     0.00  0.146     0.181     0.05  0.110     0.260   0.00 
  (0.40)    (0.645)      (0.285)    (0.370)        (0.416)     (0.542)      (0.401)    (0.641)     
Cash flow/A  0.097    0.120    0.00  0.106     0.103     0.08  0.129     0.130      0.81  0.117     0.147    0.00 
  (0.102)     (0.113)      (0.088)    (0.091)       (0.118)     (0.125)      (0.163)    (0.182)     
A  102.63      30.061      0.00  211.729     71.612     0.00  186.165      72.174     0.00  70.988     17.777     0.00 
  (138.230)     (57.025)       (267.436)    (120.719)      (236.562)    (101.597)     (108.267)     (32.321)      
Cash  3.860     1.652      0.00  10.283     4.965      0.00  9.346    4.001      0.00  3.008      1.171     0.00 
  (9.746)    
 





















Table 4A: Baseline investment model  
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
       
Q/K  0.236** 0.002  -0.010  0.193*** 
  (0.10) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06) 
Cash flow/K  0.960*** 0.391*** 0.400***  0.356*** 
  (0.35) 
 
(0.09) (0.09)  (0.12) 
Observations  2314 7757 5629  4656 
Firms  462 1539  1208 1014 
m2  0.534 0.341 0.701  0.644 
Sargan  0.188 0.129 0.123  0.316 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM system estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in 
all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in 
all columns are Q/K and Cash flow/K lagged twice or more. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m2 is a test for second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 1A. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 
5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4B: Baseline cash model 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
       
Q/A  0.008 0.003 0.001  -0.005 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Size  0.016 -0.006  0.002  0.008 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Cash flow/A  0.096* 0.118***  0.085***  0.097** 
  (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.02)  (0.05) 
Observations  2310 7747 5600  4651 
Firms  462 1539  1207 1014 
m2  0.426 0.320 0.560  0.00 
Sargan  0.620 0.05  0.283  0.05 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM system estimator. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in 
all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in 
all columns are Q/A, Size (measured as the log of the firm’s real assets), and Cash flow/A lagged twice or more. 
Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. 
The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument 
alidity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  Also see Notes to Table 1B. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5A: Investment model controlling for irreversibility with the variance of 
the labor to capital ratio 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania  UK 
          
Q/K  0.142* 0.008  -0.012  0.229***  -0.0001 
  (0.08) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.002) 
(Cash flow/K)*IRR  0.243 0.180  0.179  0.144  0.497** 
  (0.31) (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.23) 
(Cash flow/K)*(1-IRR)  1.135*** 0.386***  0.383***  0.331*  0.108** 
  (0.41) 
 
(0.11) (0.08)  (0.19)  (0.05) 
 
Observations  2314 7757  5629  4656  8852 
Firms  462 1539 1208  1014  2794 
m2  0.858 0.359  0.585  0.633  0.040 
Sargan  0.129 0.057  0.169  0.198  0.748 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1A and 4A. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i if the variance 
of firm i’s  labor to capital ratio over the period considered falls in the bottom  half of the distribution 
of the ratios  of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i, and 0 otherwise.  
   
TABLE 5B: Cash model controlling for irreversibility with the variance of the 
labor to capital ratio 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania  UK 
          
Q/A  0.037 0.032  -0.009  0.0001  -0.025 
  (0.03) (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size  0.020 -0.001  0.002  0.008  0.038** 
  (0.01) (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
(Cash flow/A)*IRR  0.230* 0.375*  0.101*  0.106**  0.381*** 
  (0.12) (0.19)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.14) 
(Cash flow/A)*(1-IRR)  -0.126 0.261  -0.037  0.074  0.335*** 
  (0.12) 
 
(0.19) (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.13) 
 
Observations  2310 7747  5600  4651  10519 
Firms  462 1539  1207  1014  2729 
m2  0.338 0.382  0.626  0.00  0.643 
Sargan  0.572 0.867  0.936  0.259  0.178 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1B and 4B. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i if the variance 
of firm i’s  labor to capital ratio over the period considered falls in the bottom  half of the distribution 
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TABLE 6A: Investment model controlling for irreversibility with industry-level 
depreciation rates 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
        
Q/K  0.188* 0.005  0.017  0.213*** 
  (0.09) (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07) 
(Cash flow/K)*IRR  -0.433 0.144*  0.202  0.205 
  (0.44) (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.26) 
(Cash flow/K)*(1-IRR)  0.778* 0.758*  0.651**  0.632*** 
  (0.45) 
 
(0.45) (0.29)  (0.13) 
Observations  2314 7757  5629  4656 
Firms  462 1539 1208  1014 
m2  0.535 0.475  0.478  0.637 
Sargan  0.520 0.154  0.034  0.491 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1A and 4A. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i if the average 
depreciation to capital ratios of the industry firm i operates in is below the median depreciation rate 
over all industries, and 0 otherwise.  
  
 
TABLE 6B: Cash model controlling for irreversibility with industry-level 
depreciation rates 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
        
Q/A  0.041 0.034  0.017  0.001 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size  0.062* -0.001  0.011  0.011 
  (0.03) (0.01)  (0.009)  (0.01) 
(Cash flow/A)*IRR  0.306 0.309* 0.128  0.165*** 
  (0.55) (0.17)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
(Cash flow/A)*(1-IRR)  0.218 0.139  0.066  0.061 
  (0.25) 
 
(0.14) (0.11)  (0.06) 
Observations  2310 7747  5600  4651 
Firms  462 1539 1207  1014 
m2  0.378 0.753  0.575  0.001 
Sargan  0.216 0.717  0.883  0.483 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1B and 4B. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i if the average 
depreciation to capital ratios of the industry firm i operates in is below the median depreciation rate 








TABLE 7A: Investment model controlling for irreversibility with I/K 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
        
Q/K  0.030 0.003  0.027  0.174*** 
  (0.08) (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
(Cash flow/K)*IRR  -0.541 -0.207  -0.106  0.014 
  (0.39) (0.31)  (0.09)  (0.23) 
(Cash flow/K)*(1-IRR)  0.714*** 0.546***  0.471***  0.424*** 
  (0.21) 
 
(0.11) (0.08)  (0.15) 
Observations  2314 7757  5629  4656 
Firms  462 1539 1208  1014 
m2  0.874 0.836  0.907  0.967 
Sargan  0.190 0.390  0.03  0.251 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1A and 4A. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i in year t if 
firm i’s  investment to capital ratio in year t falls in the bottom  half of the distribution of the ratios of 
all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
TABLE 7B: Cash model controlling for irreversibility with I/K 
  Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Romania 
        
Q/A  0.028 0.008  -0.017  0.008 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Size  0.019 0.017  0.016***  0.006 
  (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.005) 
(Cash flow/A)*IRR  0.340*** 0.309*  0.032  0.158** 
  (0.11) (0.17)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
(Cash flow/A)*(1-IRR)  0.140 0.297* 0.010  -0.002 
  (0.09) 
 
(0.15) (0.04)  (0.05) 
Observations  2310 7747  5600  4651 
Firms  462 1539 1207  1014 
m2  0.532 0.370  0.554  0.00 
Sargan  0.886 0.887  0.825  0.146 
 
Note: See Notes to Tables 1B and 4B. IRR is a dummy which takes the value 1 for firm i in year t if 
firm i’s  investment to capital ratio in year t falls in the bottom  half of the distribution of the ratios of 
all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
 